There has been a growing research interest in understanding knowledge sharing in agile development.
Introduction
Popularization of agile development methodologies has attracted interest in core practices such as pair programming (Bellini et al., 2005 , Canfora et al., 2007 , Dingsøyr et al., 2012 , where two developers share the same computer to collaborate in all aspects of software development (Canfora et al., 2004 , Müller, 2005 , Williams et al., 2000 , Sharp and Robinson, 2008 . Both collocated and distributed pair programming teams provide beneficial teamwork experiences (Hanks, 2008 , Zacharis, 2011 , Müller, 2007 . For example, ongoing collaboration and informal conversation among peers may foster sharing of embedded knowledge such as 'smart tool usage techniques' and 'knowing from war stories when to (i) cooperative rewards (are based on joint performance and divided equally between group members), and, (ii) competitive rewards (are based on individual performance and determined competitively; e.g., individuals are rewarded for outperforming team members) (Johnson and Johnson 1989) . The relation between cooperative and/or competitive rewards, team outcome variables (e.g., task speed and accuracy, social connectedness, trust), and contingent factors (e.g., task complexity) is studied frequently (Beersma et al., 2009 , Beersma et al., 2003 , Serrano and Pons, 2007 , Slavin, 1977 .
For example, research has shown that (i) cooperative rewards may lead to superior team performance in extremely high or low task-interdependence environments (Wageman and Baker, 1997) , while in moderately-interdependent environments competitive reward systems may be preferred (DeRue and Hollenbeck, 2007) , and, (ii) competitive atmospheres help individuals develop better analytical skills, whereas collaborative atmospheres prompt higher synthetic skills (Fu et al., 2009 ). Notwithstanding our existing understanding, real situations are a mixture of simultaneous cooperative and competitive reward structures (referred to as 'coopetitive reward structures') (Gordon et al., 2000) . As such, investigating the relation between reward structures and knowledge sharing necessitates paying attention to the coopetitive nature of rewards. Coopetitive structures (either 'dominant cooperative' or 'dominant competitive') are, however, a relatively unexplored area of research. This might be due to Deutsch's argument that hybrid structures, as weaker and less stable versions of strong cooperative or competitive structures, do not need independent research (Gordon et al., 2000) . Hence, further research is required to explore coopetitive reward structures in less-explored areas such as pair programming teams, identify possible differences between different types of these structures, and investigate their overall impact on knowledge sharing practices.
With this background, the present study compares the impact of two types of coopetitive reward structures on high-quality knowledge sharing in pair programming teams. The research question asks:
how do coopetitive reward structures differ in shaping high-quality knowledge sharing in pair programming teams? The concept of 'high-quality knowledge sharing' refers to situations in which peers are satisfied with the quality and usefulness of the shared knowledge for accomplishing development activities (Li and Hsieh, 2009 , Ghobadi and D'Ambra, 2012 , Ghobadi and D'Ambra, 2013 . In addressing the research question, this study makes two principal contributions. First, it develops hypotheses that explain how coopetitive rewards are different in shaping high-quality knowledge sharing practices, thus generating new understanding of the use of rewards for influencing knowledge sharing behaviors in pair programming teams. Second, an experimental process is designed and implemented to validate the hypotheses in a controlled laboratory environment, thus offering a rigorous and replicable process for simulating coopetitive structures and investigating their role in programming contexts.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. First, theoretical hypotheses are postulated, followed by a discussion on research methodology and data collection procedures. Next, the empirical results 4 are provided in detail. Theoretical implications are discussed, and strategies for managing knowledge sharing in similar contexts are outlined. The paper concludes by recommending future directions that help extend this research.
Theoretical background

Hypotheses Development
On the one hand, cooperative rewards motivate individuals to engage in collaborative behaviors, such as high-quality knowledge sharing, oriented to producing better team outcomes and acquiring joint rewards (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996 , Beersma et al., 2003 , Tan et al., 2015 . On the other hand, competitive rewards may motivate individuals to engage in the opposite set of behaviors, such as less high-quality knowledge sharing simply, to maximize individual performance and subsequent rewards (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996 , Lucker et al., 1976 , Crozier and Friedberg, 2009 , Lin and Huang, 2010 , Johnson and Johnson, 1998 . We can therefore expect that the quality of knowledge sharing in pair programming teams is higher under cooperative reward structures than competitive reward structures.
Hypothesis 1: The quality of knowledge sharing is higher under dominant cooperative reward structures than dominant competitive structures.
Task complexity has been recognized as a multi-dimensional concept (Campbell, 1988 , Wood, 1986 that can influence knowledge sharing practices (Byström and Järvelin, 1995) . According to Wood (1986) , all tasks contain three sub-components that affect their levels of complexity, including: (i) their product, (ii) the acts required to enact them, and, (iii) the information cues that need to be processed. The major difference between simple and complex tasks lies in 'the number of cues that must be processed' as well as in 'the number and complexity of the required processes' (Speier et al., 2003 , Wood, 1986 . Simple tasks are routine information processing tasks where inputs, process, and outcomes can be determined a priori, whereas difficult or complex tasks are new and genuine decision making tasks that require innovation, thereby they cannot be determined in advance (Byström and Järvelin, 1995) . Since complex tasks involve acquisition, processing and creation of complex knowledge, they require deep understanding and problem formulation (Esterhuizen et al., 2012) . Therefore, complex tasks are largely dependent upon high-quality knowledge sharing compared to simple tasks. We can therefore argue that complex tasks may benefit more from cooperative rewards than simple tasks: Teams are evolving, adaptive, and dynamic organizational systems , McGrath et al., 2000 , Gersick, 1988 . Research suggests the importance of studying the impact of past history on group-related processes (Harrison et al., 2002 , Roe, 2008 . Structural adaptation theory, for example, introduces two concepts of 'friendly competition' and 'cutthroat cooperation' to explain how teams may react to changes in reward structures (e.g., from cooperative to competitive structures, and vice versa) . Friendly competition refers to a situation where team members are assigned to work under competitive reward structures, after they have previously worked under cooperative rewards. Cutthroat cooperation refers to a situation where teams switch from working under competitive reward structures to cooperative structures. Structural adaptation theory suggests that (i) the benefits associated with cooperative reward structures will be less in groups with a past history of competition (cutthroat cooperation), and, (ii) the negative impacts of competition will be less in groups with a past history of cooperation (friendly competition). We can, therefore, expect that the history of working under similar reward structure can influence team communication as well as the overall team performance. In the context of pair programming, prior cooperative experience encourages peers to engage in high-quality knowledge sharing. By contrast, prior competition in projects or other organizational settings may decrease the quality of knowledge sharing practices. We therefore state: Coopetition literature views knowledge sharing using insights from game theory (Loebbecke et al., 1999 , Shih et al., 2006 . According to this literature, knowledge may have two value components, including: (i) the basic value, and, (ii) the value-added . The component of 'basic value' refers to the recognized value of knowledge. The 'value-added' component reflects the competitive advantage of receiving knowledge, which is not fully known for the person who shares it. These two components can turn individuals into sharing or withholding knowledge to maximize their advantage. The value-added, for example, explains why sometimes people may share knowledge easily based on their estimation of the basic value of knowledge, without being aware of the competitive advantage of knowledge for receivers. Similarly, people's perception of the value-added, which may not necessarily be true, may lead to them hoard knowledge even though sharing that knowledge may produce synergic results. In this complex context, peers may largely rely on their prior knowledge sharing experiences whether to share or not to share high-quality knowledge. For example, if they were satisfied with the outcome and consequences of engaging in knowledge sharing (e.g., they were rewarded, they learnt new skills, they felt the experience was fair), they tend to continue this practice in future as well (Willem and Buelens, 2009 
Research Methodology
Method
Research on software engineering (Sjøberg et al., 2005) , pair programming teams (Balijepally et al., 2009) , and reward systems (Ferrin and Dirks, 2003, Beersma et al., 2009) 
Factors
Tasks: The main lecturer in charge of the Java programming course, at the university where the experiments were conducted, was consulted for designing the experimental tasks. As a result of discussions and investigating several options, a number of pair testing tasks were designed. Pair testing involves discovering and resolving errors in a code (Williams et al., 2000 , Sjøberg et al., 2005 . Pair testing has a hybrid nature since pairs need to split up to run test cases, but they also need to collaborate and find the best resolutions. Pair testing also allows for quantifying team and individuals' performance through identifying individuals' contributions. Pair testing is suitable for this study because it aligns with the mixed nature of coopetition and with our interest in studying coopetitive rewards.
Two information-related criteria guided the design of simple and complex tasks, including (i) routine (simple) versus genuine information processing (complex), and, (ii) no need to seek information through different channels (simple) versus a need to seek information through different channels (complex) (Speier et al., 2003, Byström and Järvelin, 1995) . Simple tasks involved identifying and resolving five manipulated errors in a Java code related to 'add or subtract days to current date'.
Complex tasks involved identifying ten manipulated errors in a Java code related to 'calculate a rectangle area'. This study did not assign the conventional roles of driver and observer to peers, rather we followed the concept of 'self-organizing agile teams' to allow peers to organize themselves (Cockburn and .
Rewards: Coopetition in collaborative contexts is both a reality and necessity . In pair programming, developers are encouraged to cooperate and engage in high-quality knowledge sharing (Balijepally et al., 2009 ). Yet, peers' perceptions of how management recognizes expertise and efforts, assigns credit for success, and judges who contributed most to the overall performance, may create competitive sensations, which inhibit high-quality knowledge sharing (Wray, 2010) . Therefore, the research design created controlled coopetitive structures to examine carefully their role in shaping knowledge sharing behaviors. Specifically, we follow a 70% and 30% reward mix to create dominant cooperative and dominant competitive reward structures (Serrano and Pons, 2007) . The dominant cooperative structure (type 1) includes a 70% cooperative and 30% competitive reward mix, whereas the dominant competitive structure (type 2) includes a 70% competitive and 30% cooperative reward mix. Table 1 shows the reward system for each type of task. The pair received cooperative points based on the overall number of the pair's resolved errors; each peer was awarded the same number of points. The peer who resolved the most errors received competitive points; however, if peers resolved the same numbers of errors the competitive points were equally divided between them.
For example, (i) a peer assigned to a simple task and a dominant cooperative reward system (simple/ cooperative) could receive up to 70 points for cooperative rewards (70/5=14 points for resolving each error) and 30 points for competitive rewards (as a winner), (ii) a peer assigned to a simple task and a dominant competitive reward system (simple/ competitive) received up to 30 points for cooperative rewards (30/5=6 points for resolving each error) and 70 points for competitive rewards (as a winner), and (iii) a peer assigned to a complex task and a dominant cooperative reward system (complex/ cooperative) received up to 70 points for cooperative rewards (70/10=7 points for resolving each error) and 30 points for competitive rewards (as a winner). 
Variables
The variables for examining the hypotheses (H1-H4) include: 'high-quality knowledge sharing' and 'knowledge sharing satisfaction'. High-quality knowledge sharing refers to situations in which peers are satisfied with the quality and usefulness of the shared knowledge for accomplishing development activities, and it was measured using three items adopted from the previous literature (Li and Hsieh, 2009 , Ghobadi and D'Ambra, 2013 , Ghobadi and D'Ambra, 2012 . Knowledge sharing satisfaction was defined as the overall level of satisfaction gained from prior knowledge sharing experience. For 8 example, the peers may have shared highly useful knowledge (high-quality knowledge sharing), but they may have found the overall atmosphere competitive or unfair (e.g., only one person shard useful knowledge; low level of knowledge satisfaction). Knowledge sharing satisfaction was measured using four items adopted from the previous literature (Willem and Buelens, 2009 ).
To create a 'history of working under a similar reward structure' (H3) as well as to examine 'knowledge sharing satisfaction' (H4), two rounds of experiments were designed in which pairs were working on a different task but with similar level of complexity and under a similar reward system.
Suggested by existing literature, co-variant variables were also included (age and personality traits (extroversion; agreeableness)) as they may influence knowledge sharing behaviors (Beersma et al., 2003) . The majority of participants were in their second or third year of undergraduate studies (with some being postgraduates). Considering age (20-26 years old) and education levels, such individuals are perceived to serve as an important source of part-time labor (Biron and Bamberger, 2010) .
Measures are included in section 3.5.
Recruiting Participants
The research methodology involved 64 individuals recruited from the database of computer science and information systems students in an Australian university. The students formed 32 pair programming teams, and participated in 32 two-round experiments. The lab administrator sent a letter of invitation to the students registered in the database. The letter stated that (i) a background of programming in Java is required, (ii) students can practice their Java skills during tasks, and, (iii) students would be paid up to $50 based on their performance. Students were asked to send an expression of interest stating their prior experience with Java programming. 65 students contacted the researcher, and based on their relevance to the study (experience with Java), 64 students were selected.
Experimental Procedure
A seven-step design process was designed and implemented CCM8 ). For example, SCP11 and SCP12 (peers in pair SCP1) were pre-assigned to sit at the lab stations of 1 and 6 (according to the first list). The lists were used as a guide at the time of the students' arrival in the lab, as discussed in the following section. In addition, pairs only communicated using anonymous ID codes and via an instant messaging application that was available in the lab (http://spark.en.softonic.com). Finally, the procedure, sample and measures, as well as the order in which the questions were asked, were carefully discussed with experts in experimental design.
Entering the lab: Upon arrival, the researcher asked the name of each individual to check the type of tasks that s/he was pre-assigned to (based on her/his coding competency). Looking at the ID lists (either for simple or complex tasks), each individual was assigned randomly to a pair ID and was given a briefing form. The form stated her/his individual ID, her/his seat number, and her/his peer's ID. The form explained that the experiment includes two rounds of 20-minute Java coding activity and a 10-minute break in between. After participants were located, the researcher gave them a form to note their demographic details (age, personality traits). Regarding extroversion, participants were asked to indicate their level of extroversion from '1 = I prefer to work independently from others' to '5 = I enjoy working with others in a group'. Regarding agreeableness, respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreeableness from '1 = I am competitive rather than cooperative' to '5 = I am eager to help and be helped in return.
Experiment (round 1):
Each participant was given the relevant coding task and the reward system (one of the rows of Table 1 ). The reward system explained how they can earn points and subsequent cash based on their performance. The researcher asked participants to log into the instant messaging system, add their peer ID, and start working in the first round of the experiment. All the discussions online were monitored to make sure that students do not reveal identity. After 20 minutes of activity, students reported their resolutions and noted who has resolved each of the errors; they sent this 10 information to the researcher ID that was visible to them. In the case of conflict between peers, a third-party (a PhD candidate) checked the archive of communications to provide resolution.
After experiment and point estimations:
The students were given a questionnaire asking them questions that measure high-quality knowledge sharing in the first round (Li and Hsieh, 2009, Ghobadi and D'Ambra, 2013 are awarded 56 and 86 points, respectively (the team resolved four errors all together). The purpose of informing peers about each other's points was to influence their satisfaction of knowledge sharing practices, and in turn influence their knowledge sharing behaviors in the second round of the experiment (e.g., the person who received 56 (30 points less) may become more reserved in sharing knowledge in the second round to be able to receive the competitive point).
Break between experiments:
The participants were asked to stay within the lab and not to talk to others during the 10-minute break. Toward the end of the break, the researcher administrated a questionnaire that included 6 questions for checking 'how well rewards and tasks were manipulated in the previous round' and for measuring 'knowledge sharing satisfaction from the previous round'.
Regarding task complexity, respondents rated complexity of the task they had completed on a scale ranging from '1 = not at all complex' to '5 = complex'. Regarding reward manipulation, participants indicated their degree of agreement with a statement using a scale ranging from 1 to 5; one end was 
Experiment (round 2):
After the break, each pair worked on a new coding task with similar level of complexity and under the same reward system. After 20 minutes of activity, students reported their resolutions and noted who resolved each of the errors. A questionnaire asking about manipulation checks and high-quality knowledge sharing in the second round was administrated.
Final point estimations and payments:
The researcher calculated the final points for each individual in both rounds, and each person was paid accordingly.
Results
Manipulation Checks. As described in the experimental procedure, manipulation questions were asked to check how well tasks (simple/complex) as well as rewards ('dominant cooperative/dominant competitive) were simulated. To avoid non-independence of observations, only data provided by one random member of each pair was used (Ferrin and Dirks, 2003) . The results of t-tests revealed significant differences across the manipulated conditions. Specifically, (i) the respondents assigned to the dominant cooperative reward structure viewed the reward system as more cooperative (M=1.75, SD=0.577), whereas the respondents assigned to the dominant competitive reward structure viewed the reward system as more competitive (M=3.63, SD=0.5) (t (16)=9.82, p<0.05), and, (ii) the respondents assigned to work under simple tasks viewed the task more simple (M=2.31, SD=0.793) and the respondents assigned to work under complex tasks viewed the task more complex (M=3.56, SD=0.934) (t (16)=4.005, p<0.005). Although 2 X 2 factorial ANOVA conducted on both reward and task checks yielded the main effect for reward and task conditions, neither task or reward conditions did have significant unintended interaction effect on the task and reward manipulation checks, respectively (F(3, 28)=0.832, p=0.488), (F(3, 28) =0.048, p=0.827). The descriptive statistics and the intercorrelations are displayed in Table 2 . To avoid non-independence of observations, we only use data provided by one random member of each pair (Ferrin and Dirks, 2003) . 
N=32; ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Validities. A confirmatory factor analysis of the high-quality knowledge sharing in both rounds and knowledge sharing satisfaction indicated a good fit and supported convergent validity of the constructs (Chi-Square=261.494 df=45, p<0.001; most of the factor loadings> 0.7 (two were close at 0.68). Table 3 also shows correlations between the three identified factors. Extracted variances between high-quality knowledge sharing in both rounds and knowledge sharing satisfaction were considerably greater than the correlation square between them, establishing discriminant validity of the constructs (high-quality knowledge sharing (round1) and knowledge sharing satisfaction: 0.6 > 0.11; high-quality knowledge sharing (round1) and high-quality knowledge sharing (round2): 0.74 > 0.47; high-quality knowledge sharing (round2) and knowledge sharing satisfaction: 0.75 > 0/17). Univariate analysis is a statistical test for examining the association of one specific variable with the phenomenon of interest. As such, this test was used to examine whether the difference in the quality of the knowledge being shared under dominant cooperative reward structures and dominant competitive reward structures (H2) is greater for complex tasks compared to simple tasks (variable).
The interaction effect analysis confirmed the hypothesis (F=16.04, df=1, p<0.001; F=5.04, df=1, Analyzing communication between peers via the instant messaging system supported these insights.
For example, in dominant cooperative structures, satisfying and friendly messages before and after the first break were observed: "no worries mate, it's time to show your java skills" or "good game.
Hopefully we can get through this". However, peers did communicate and chat less in competitive structures. Finally, the possible impact of demographic variables (age and personality traits) on highquality knowledge sharing and knowledge sharing satisfaction were examined. The regression analysis and coefficients did not show a significant relation between the demographics and the study's variables (p>0.05). The results are discussed in the following section.
Discussion
Theoretical Implications
Although research on knowledge sharing in agile development is gaining theoretical rigor (Ramesh et al., 2012, Ghobadi and Mathiassen, 2014) , focused research on its underlying knowledge-intensive practices (e.g., pair programming) is scarce (Balijepally et al., 2009 ). This study is undertaken to shed more light on high-quality knowledge sharing practices in pair programming teams, where knowledge sharing may face difficulties with regard to the nature of pair programming tasks, daily social relationships, and the competitive nature of knowledge (Cockburn, 2006 , Conboy et al., 2010 , Nerur et al., 2005 , Chan and Thong, 2009 ).
To investigate knowledge sharing in this context, the present study borrows the perspective of the 'coopetitive reward structures' from social interdependence theory (Deutsch, 1949) and insights regarding 'coopetitive knowledge sharing' from the software development and coopetition literature (Ghobadi and D'Ambra, 2013 , Loebbecke et al., 1999 , Ghobadi and D'Ambra, 2012 sharing satisfaction, the findings affirm prior research suggesting that pre-existing conditions determine how rewards influence group outcomes (Ferrin and Dirks, 2003) . By demonstrating the superiority of dominant cooperative reward structures, the results indicate that dominant cooperative and competitive reward structures still correspond to their extreme version of cooperative and competitive reward structures, thereby adhering to the coopetition literature in the context of pair programming teams (Deutsch, 1949, Johnson and . Existing research reports that flaws and inconsistencies in measuring 'coopetition' often lead to contrary results about the role of cooperation and competition in collaborative contexts which the experimental steps should be executed to create carefully a sense of cooperation and competition among peers. In addition to being useful for replication in pair programming research, the experimental process contributes to advancing the recent emphasis on understanding inevitable coopetitive structures at intra-organizational levels (Ghobadi and D'Ambra, 2012) . Experimental setting has been useful in examining the relation between rewards and knowledge sharing for at least three reasons. First, it has allowed us to control for confounding effects (e.g., age, personality traits) which may influence this relationship (evidence: no significant impact of cofounding effects on knowledge sharing). Second, it has enabled us to simulate coopetitive rewards in a robust manner (evidence: significant supporting results in the manipulation checks). Third, it allowed comparing the knowledge sharing consequences of the contrasting styles of rewards in the controlled context (evidence: checking hypotheses).
Practical Implications
Team-based incentives are commonly used to promote better performance and improve coordination of efforts (Garvey, 2002) . In response, research has studied how rewards may best support team-based structures (Lin et al., 2008 , Taylor, 2006 
Limitation and Concluding Points
This study contributes to the literature by (i) generating new understanding of the use of rewards for promoting knowledge sharing in pair programming teams, and (ii) offering a rigorous and replicable experimental process for simulating coopetitive structures and investigating their role in pair programming and in similar collaborative contexts. Experimental tasks were designed with the input from an expert who had taught the course for more than fifteen years and has remained active in corporate software development endeavors. The median duration of experiments in software engineering is reported to be one hour (Sjøberg et al., 2005) , which is consistent with the duration of experiments in this study. We acknowledge a number of limitations that provide the opportunity for future research.
First, the sample of 64 students and 32 experiments may be adequate for the statistical analysis (2 X 2 design), yet the sample may be extended. Future research may check the results in larger samples and with different characteristics (e.g., different tasks). Second, the timing of each round as well as the break between the two rounds were relatively short to allow possible learning effects to unfold and allow more high-quality knowledge sharing to emerge (Wang et al., 2015) . It is recommended to develop controlled experiments with extended periods. Third, this study used quantitative measures that are proposed and validated in software, coopetition, and knowledge management literature. Both qualitative and quantitative analysis using objective data such as observation of task processes and conversations may extend the findings and lead to development of new hypotheses and propositions.
Fourth, the design process allocated the less experienced students to the simple tasks. In this study, postgraduate students, generally older, were information systems students, taking this course to be familiar with programming principles. Thus, they were not necessarily more experienced in Java than the first or second year undergraduate software engineering students. Yet, the results showed a correlation between age and task complexity ( Table 2 ), suggesting that there is a greater difference in the quality of knowledge sharing under dominant cooperative reward structures and dominant competitive reward structures for more experienced programmers compared to less experienced programmers. Future research should pay attention to the role of 'programming experience' while investigating the difference in the quality of knowledge sharing under dominant cooperative reward structures and dominant competitive reward structure (Hypothesis 2).
Fifth, this study compared the impact of two types of reward structure on high-quality knowledge sharing in pair programming teams. Knowledge sharing is noted to mediate the impact of rewards on group outcomes (Deutsch, 1949) . Extant literature also acknowledges high-quality knowledge sharing as an essential aspect of agile development teams (Gupta and Bajwa, 2012, Ghobadi and Mathiassen, 2014 ). Yet, it would be of absolute value to develop new qualitative and quantitative studies that include other outcome variables such as software quality or project success (Hulkko and Abrahamsson, 2005) and investigate the role of coopetitive rewards on them. Such studies, as also advocated by existing research reviews (Pais and dos Santos, 2014) , will advance our understanding of how the three layers of 'coopetitive structures', 'high-quality knowledge sharing' and 'performance outcomes' interact and influence each other.
